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False positives arise when people without disorders are diagnosed as having disorders.
Various approaches for avoiding faise positives have been suggested. This review critically
assesses the roles of zones of rarity, the threshold problem (the problem of determining the
boundary of disorder in cases that shade into normality), and the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) criterion that requires that a disorder cause clinically
significant impairment or distress (the harm criterion). The lack of zones of rarity in much
of psychiatry gives rise to the threshold problem. The DSM harm criterion is frequently
presented as offering a solution to the threshold problem. However, I argue that the harm
criterion cannot offer a general solution to the threshold problem, as harm is not always
correlated with the intensity and frequency of symptoms. Still, the harm criterion is essential
to ensure that people who are merely different are not diagnosed as having a disorder.
The threshold problem can be addressed by selecting symptom-based cut-off points to
distinguish between disorder and normality. These cut-off points are frequently arbitrary in
the sense that they often reflect no natural division between disorder and normal, but they
may be more or less wisely chosen. Where possible, the thresholds should be set so that
the advantages of diagnosis can be expected to outweigh the disadvantages.
Éviter les faux positifs : les zones de rareté, le problème du seuil, et
le critère de significativité clinique du DSM
Les faux positifs surviennent lorsque les personnes exemptes de troubles se font
diagnostiquer des troubles. Diverses approches ont été suggérées pour éviter les faux
positifs. Cette revue évalue de façon critique les rôles des zones de rareté, du problème
du seuil (le problème de déterminer la limite du trouble dans les cas qui se confondent
avec la normalité), et le critère du Manuel diagnostique et statistique des troubles mentaux
(DSM) qui demande qu'un trouble cause une incapacité ou une détresse clinlquement
significative (le critère des dommages). L'absence de zones de rareté dans une grande
partie de la psychiatrie donne lieu au problème du seuil. Le critère des dommages du DSM
est fréquemment présenté comme offrant une solution au problème du seuil. Toutefois, je
fais valoir que le critère des dommages ne peut offrir une solution générale au problème
du seuil, car les dommages ne sont pas toujours córreles à l'intensité et à la fréquence des
symptômes. Tout de même, le critère des dommages est essentiel pour faire en sorte que
les personnes qui sont simplement différentes ne se fassent pas diagnostiquer un trouble.
Le problème du seuil peut être traité en sélectionnant des points d'inclusion basés sur les
symptômes pour distinguer entre trouble et normalité. Ces points d'inclusion sont souvent
arbitraires au sens où ils ne reflètent souvent aucune division naturelle entre trouble et
normalité, mais qu'ils peuvent être choisis avec plus ou moins de discernement. Autant
que possible, les seuils devraient être déterminés de manière à ce que les avantages du
diagnostic puissent l'emporter sur les désavantages.
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False positives occur when nondisorder is mistaken fordisorder. False positives lead to people witbout disorders
being unnecessarily exposed to the eosts of psychiatric
diagnosis (for example, drug side effects and stigma)
and to inflated prevalence rates tbat distort healtb care
planning. Classic examples show tbat false positives arise
for different reasons. In tbe case of homosexuality, mere
difference was mistaken for disorder. Going further back,
in tbe mediealization of runaway slaves, a normal reaction
to oppression was mistaken for individual pathology.
Currently, many worry when conditions that shade into
everyday difficulties are diagnosed, for example, at tbe
boundary between shyness and social anxiety disorder. A
key claim of tbis paper is that as false positives arise for
various reasons no one solution will suffice to rule them
out; a battery of approacbes to avoiding false positives will
be required.
The Role of Zones of Rarity
The idea tbat zones of rarity sbould separate valid disorders
from other disorders and normality has a long history,
cbampioned most notably by Robert Kendell' (witb
Jablensky^). If one imagines plotting cases of disorder in
multidimensional property spaee (as in cluster analysis),
zones of rarity occur whenever sparsely populated spaee
separates clusters. Wben classifieatory boundaries align
witb zones of rarity tben nature is eut at its joints, and tbe
informational content of categories is maximized. If zones
of rarity eould be identified between disorders and normality
tben one may hope this eould help avoid false positives.
Some marker may be identified that securely located a ease
to either the disorder or tbe normality side of tbe zone.
The major concern for people adopting tbis picture is tbe
seeming scarcity of zones of rarity within psycbopatbology.
Tbis triggers ealls for more research in tbe bope of locating
zones, or leads to resignation tbat psyebiatry must resort to
a dimensional system.^
However, I suggest tbat locating zones of rarity is less
important tban often thought. Characterizing successful
classification as cutting nature at its joints leads one
to suppose tbat euts sbould be made at zones of rarity.
However, tbe butebery metaphor is frequently inappropriate.
In many domains tbere are eitber no joints or too many. Tbe
philosopher John Dupré suggests that when thinking about
tbe relation between classification and the world we should
be realists, but "promiscuous realists."^-1'''''''^" Typically,
wben a domain is plotted in multidimensional spaee, the
pattern of similarities is complex. Out of this complexity, one
ean extract different classifications that may be useful for
different purposes. Rather than thinking in terms of eutting
Abbreviations
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
IDD intellectual disability disorder
SAD social anxiety disorder
Highlights
• The DSM criterion that requires that a disorder cause
clinically significant impairment or distress (the harm
criterion) is required to prevent people who are merely
different from being diagnosed as having a disorder.
• The absence of zones of rarity between disorders
and normality gives rise to the threshold problem (the
problem of determining the boundary of disorder in
conditions that shade into normality).
• The threshold problem should be addressed by
selecting symptom-based cut-off points to distinguish
disorder from normal.
nature at its joints, a better metaphor for thinking about the
way in which empirical evidence ean guide classification is
to think of a mountaineer picking a route. The path ehosen
is informed by the terrain, but rarely determined by it.
Different walkers will prefer different paths; those looking
for an easy ascent may piek the shallowly rising ridge, those
looking for excitement may opt for the rocky gullies, and
those who have forgotten sunscreen may stiek to the shade.
Often a domain will either contain no zones of rarity, or at
least none that are appropriate for marking the distinction
between the normal and the pathological. Kendell and
Jablensky- claim that disorders defined based on syndromes
ean only be considered valid if separated from other disorders
and normality by zones of rarity. Disorders that shade into
normality are merely "arbitrary loci in a multidimensional
space."- P * While such categories may have clinical utility,
and enable predictions to be made regarding etiology,
prognosis, and so on, as the boundaries of such disorders
are chosen as opposed to discovered, they are vulnerable to
replaeement by different successor classifications. For this
reason, Kendell and Jablensky^ see "utility" as second best
to "validity."''"
I suggest it is a mistake to think that elassifieations of
domains that lack zones of rarity must be second rate.
Many respectable scientific classifications describe
eontinuous domains. Alloys provide a good example;
knowledge of the composition of an alloy allows accurate
predietions regarding a sample's behaviour. Similarly, if
mental disorders vary continuously, this need not limit the
prospects for scientific progress. Kendell and Jablensky^
are eorreet that divisions imposed on a continuous domain
could have been differently chosen, but they are wrong in
thinking that alternative possible classifications undermine
the classification that is adopted. Kendell and Jablensky^
view alternative classifications as competing in a zero-sum
game; if one classifieation is valid, then alternatives must
be invalid. From the promiscuous realist account, this is a
mistake, and alternative classifications can be equally valid
in the sense that they provide equally good mappings of
different features of reality.
That said, the absence of zones of rarity does leave us with
the question of where the threshold should be drawn between
normality and disorder. The approach taken by DSM-IV is
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to rely on judgments that the syndrome is severe enough
to cause clinically significant distress or impairment. The
impact of this criterion and whether it can be used to deal
with the threshold problem will now be considered.
The DSM Criterion That Disorders Cause
Clinically Significant Distress or Impairment
In DSM-IV, both the introductory definition of mental
disorder and many of the diagnostic criteria sets contain
a clinical significance criterion. The wording varies, but
generally symptoms must cause "clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of fijnctioning."''P' Let us call this the harm
criterion. The DSM-IV introduetion explains.
This criterion helps establish the threshold for
the diagnosis of a disorder in those situations
in which the sytnptomatic presentation by itself
(particularly in its milder forms) is not inherently
pathological.. . ' ^ ^
Revisions made in DSM-5 threaten this criterion. The
new definition of mental disorder does not require that all
disorders cause harm, but rather notes that "Mental disorders
are usually associated with significant distress or disability
in social, occupational, or other important activities."*- P °^
Harm has ceased to be necessary for a diagnosis of at least
some disorders.
I will argue that the hann criterion is essential for
avoiding false positives and should have been retained
for all disorders. However, I suggest that DSM-IV makes
a mistake in presenting the harm criterion as a general
solution to the threshold problem. False positives occur for
different reasons. Some occur when harmless conditions
are mistaken for disorders, some when errors are made in
setting the threshold between normality and disorder, and
some for other reasons. In general, false positives that arise
in different ways must be dealt with differently. The harm
criterion is needed to ensure that harmless conditions are
not diagnosed as disorders, but I will show that it cannot
provide a general solution to the threshold problem.
To see why the harm criterion is crucial to prevent harmless
difference being diagnosed as disorder, let us retnember
how it came to be introduced. After a period of controversy,
homosexuality was removed from DSM in 1973. Evidenee
that was influential in the debates included data showing
that homosexuality is far more coinmon than previously
thought, that homosexuality is not linked with indicators
of psychopathology, and that many homosexual people are
happy and high functioning. Robeti Spitzer played a key
role in the debates and found defining disorder useful in
defending his stance on homosexuality.'-*
Spitzer's definition of mental disorder requires that patients
suffer distress or disability to be considered to have a
disorder. As homosexuality need not be linked with distress
or disability, homosexuality, per se, cannot be a disorder
under Spitzer's definition. Eventually a version of Spitzer's
definition came to be included in the introduction of
DSM-lII, and the DSM-IV definition is a direct descendent.
The idea that disorders must be harmful has since been
inñuentially defended by Jerome Wakefield,''" who claims
that disorders are harmful dysftinctions, and is also accepted
by many others.""'-^
The case of homosexuality illustrates why the harm criterion
is essential. Homosexuality is statistically unusual, it may
occur as a result of some evolutionary dysfunction, and yet,
as it causes no harm, we do not want to consider it a disorder.
In keeping with such thinking, the DSM-IV approach
allows that people who are psychologically different, but
who are not harmed by their difference, should not be given
a diagnosis. The new DSM-5 definition of mental disorder
is less clear on this issue.
Whether a condition causes harm is only sometimes
determined by the frequency and intensity of symptoins (note
that by symptoms here I do not mean to imply pathology).
There are conditions, most obviously depression, where
symptoms are intrinsically unpleasant and, in such cases, the
degree of harm will plausibly be correlated with symptom
severity. In these conditions, measures of either harm or
symptom severity may equally well be used to distinguish
normality from disorder. However, the symptoms that
characterize some other conditions only sometimes cause
harm, even when symptoms are intense and frequent.
Consider those associated with Asperger disorder. Whether
these cause problems depends on multiple factors.
Symptom severity plays a role, but so, too, does the material
and social environment; for many people with Asperger
disorder, the inereased availability of computer-based
means of communication has facilitated social interaction."
A person's own likes, interests, and ambitions are also
important; a degree of social awkwardness may be career-
destroying for an aspiring social worker but acceptable in
an engineer.
As there need be no linear relation between symptom
severity and degree of harm, the hann criterion does not
offer a general solution to the threshold problem (that is,
the problem of determining whether symptoms are severe
enough to count as disorder). The harm criterion primarily
does something different—it prevents the diagnosis of
people who are different but who are not harmed by their
difference, and these people may not be those whose
symptoms are only mild. Note that while harm is necessary
for disorder, it is by no means sufficient—no harmless
states should be classified as disorders, but not all harmful
states are disorders (some are normal but unpleasant states,
some are nonmedical problems).
Although their earlier work was inftuential in securing
the place of the harm criterion in DSM-IV, Spitzer and
Wakefield" have recently been critical of its continuing use.
To defend the harm criterion, I will consider and rebut each
of their objections.
First, Spitzer and Wakefield hold that the harm criterion
is frequently redundant. 1 admit that the criterion does
more work in some contexts than others. As Spitzer and
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Wakefield note,'' the harm criterion often plays little role
in clinical practice."* However, plausibly this is because
most mental health professionals see only patients who
believe they need help, or who are perceived by other lay
people (for example, the police) to have a problem. This
initial screening helps ensure that clinicians see people who
are likely to be experiencing symptoms that cause hann.
The situation is quite different when DSM is used outside
the clinical context. Prevalence rates gained via screening
community populations plausibly include many false
positives. These arise for various reasons, but some are
people who have so-called symptoms but are not bothered
by them. In evaluating the importance of the hann criterion,
it should also be remembered that DSM plays a cultural role
in shaping lay perceptions of disorder and normality. Within
the community, there are many people who are physically
or psychologically different and yet have flourishing lives.
The inclusion of the harm criterion in DSM-IV did real work
in helping to legitimate people's claims that they are merely
different and not disordered. In all contexts, the extent to
which the harm criterion can help avoid false positives
will vary with diagnosis. The effect on diagnoses such as
depression is minimal,'*" as the symptoms of depression
are intrinsically unpleasant. However, there are many other
conditions, including Asperger disorder, transsexualism,
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, Tourette syndrome,
and hypoactive sexual desire disorder, where symptoms
may or may not cause problems.
Second, Spitzer and Wakefield" suggest that the harm
criterion causes false negatives. They offer examples of
patients who they think should be considered disordered,
but who cannot be diagnosed if the harm criterion are
enforced. These range from a high-functioning drug user
to a man with erectile dysfunction who is not distressed
by his impotence. I deny these are false negatives. High-
functioning people who voluntarily take drugs are not
disordered (though they may be considered to be foolishly
risking their health). Harmless impotence should be
understood as a mere difference rather than a disorder.
This may rankle, as impotence is plausibly an evolutionary
dysfunction, but in so far as it causes no harm, it should not
be considered a disorder; to say anything else here raises
issues of consistency with the homosexuality case (why
would it be okay to be gay, but not to be impotent?).
Third, Spitzer and Wakefield," and other critics,-" worry
that the harm criterion is hard to operationalize. This worry
is partly powered by a misunderstanding of the work of
the harm criterion. If one assumes that the harm criterion
deals only with false positives produced by the threshold
problem,"-" then it is easy to think that it could be replaced
by more specific guidance regarding required symptoms.
For example, instead of requiring that, say, hypoactive
sexual desire causes harm, one may precisely specify the
symptoms required (for example, having been uninterested
in sex for such and such a period). However, as I have
argued, false positives occur for various reasons. Not all
are related to problems with thresholds. Some people are
highly symptomatic but are not harmed by their symptoms.
The harm criterion is crucial to ensure that sueh people are
regarded as merely different rather than disordered.
Given that the harm criterion is required, how might it
be operationalized? It is easy to get bogged down by the
apparent difficulties. Of course, there are deep philosophical
problems with determining the nature of harm, or its
converse, the nature of the good life. These are real issues,
but it is also important not to focus on difficulties to the
extent that one overlooks how many judgments can be
made easily and with very widespread agreement. Within
psychiatry, the key questions do not concem what sorts
of lives are the very best, but which are good enough, and
often judgments of this sort are easy to make. There is veiy
broad agreement about the components of a good enough
life, which will include the following: freedom from
persistent unpleasant experiences (pain, panic, and so on);
being able to engage in those activities that are essential
for self-maintenance, such as washing and cooking; having
some friends; and being able to engage in some sorts of
meaningful activity (which may be a job or a hobby).
Such notions can be operationalized via one or more of the
many existing scales that seek to measure quality of life or
impairment.
An altemative approach is suggested when one remembers
that false positives are plausibly more frequent in
community prevalence studies than in the clinic. People who
are not harmed by their symptoms neither refer themselves
for treatment nor are they sent by concemed others. This
suggests the second possibility for operationalizing the
harm criterion—one simply asks respondents whether they
have sought or would like treatment. Of course, some people
lack insight and believe themselves to have acceptable lives
when they do not. In an attempt to deal with such cases,
one might either automatically consider people with certain
symptoms (for example, maybe delusions) to be in need
of care, or also ask the respondents' friends or relatives
whether they think the person needs help. Something like
this approach was taken in the National Institute of Mental
Health Epidemiologie Catchment Area Program and the
National Comorbidity Study, which asked respondents
about health care usage (and also the degree to which
symptoms interfere with their lives).-'
I am hopeful that an acceptable method, or methods, for
operationalizing the harm criterion will be found. Still,
even if it turns out that the harm criterion cannot be neatly
operationalized, it is still required. This conclusion may
seem more palatable if it is remembered that psychiatric
diagnosis already and essentially relies on numerous
notions that cannot be cleanly operationalized, for example,
whether a response is culturally expectable or is due to
social conflict, or whether a delusion is bizarre.
Returning to the Threshold Problem
I have argued that the harm criterion is essential but that
it cannot deal with the threshold problem; as in many
conditions, whether symptoms cause harm will not be
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linearly related to their severity. How then rnight the
threshold probletn be dealt with? The only solution is to
pick some objectively specifiable but ultimately arbitrary
cut-off point. In the same sort of way that the cut-off point
for high blood pressure is chosen to be a particular figure,
the cut-off point between heaving drinking and alcoholism
may be taken to depend on a certain number of units of
alcohol being consumed during a certain nuinber of days.
For a disorder to be diagnosed, it would both be necessary
that it cause harm and also that the symptoms meet the cut-
ofï point for symptom severity.
An example of a diagnosis where the approach I am
suggesting has long been accepted is IDD (known as mental
retardation in DSM-IV). Diagnosis requires both an IQ
score of less than about 70 and for there to be problems in
everyday living. Here the IQ score deals with the threshold
problem, and the requirement that there be problems in
everyday living is a version of the harm criterion. Both
are required. Some people with IQs of much less than 70
have flourishing lives. The harm criterion ensures that such
people do not receive a diagnosis. Some people with IQs
far above 70 face problems in living caused by their lack of
intelligence, but the cut-off point ensures that such people
are considered to be normal but unintelligent rather than
disordered. The example of IDD also makes it clear why a
universal cut-off point is required for the threshold, rather
than it being acceptable to adopt an individualized approach
and to claim that people should be considered disordered
whenever their sytnptoms are severe enough to cause them
harm. People who are diagnosed are typically eligible for
various services and benefits. For these to be distributed
fairly, a universal cut-off point is required.
To take another example, consider the difference between
shyness and SAD. Both shy people and those with SAD
find social interaction problematic and seek to avoid it. For
a diagnosis of SAD, both the harm criterion and criteria
relating to threshold must be satisfied. Some people may be
very shy, but experience no harm (maybe, for example, they
are members of a contemplative religious cotnmunity). The
harm criterion acts to ensure that such people are merely
seen as different and do not receive a diagnosis. Conversely,
some slightly shy people may be greatly disadvantaged by
their personality trait (if, for example, they attempt to make
their living in the brash world of Wall Street). Still, such
people only receive a diagnosis if their symptoms exceed
some specified threshold; current guidelines specify their
fear and anxiety must be marked, and this threshold could
be made more precise.
Deciding the exact cut-off point for the threshold is often
an arbitrary decision, in the sense that frequently there are
no natural divisions to be mapped. Still, a choice may be
more or less wise. Where possible, the threshold should
be set such that the benefits of diagnosis (which may
include benefits that accrue from treatment that aims to
reduce the risk of future harm) will usually outweigh the
disadvantages. Many of the controversies that emerged
during the period of proposed changes to DSM-5 can
be seen as being rooted in worries that cut-off points for
some diagnoses may have been selected unwisely, such
that people who could more profitably be considered
normal would be considered disordered. Examples include
psychosis risk syndrome," mixed anxiety depression," and
pedophilic disorder, hebephilic type (arguably adults who
have sex with teenagers are more appropriately considered
normal criminals than disordered).-'' The best way to deal
with such controversies is via detailed cost-benefit analyses
of the expected consequences of altering the previously
accepted tliresholds.-^'"
Conclusions
I have argued that the harm criterion is essential to prevent
people who are merely different being diagnosed as having
a disorder. The harm criterion cannot deal with the threshold
problem because harm is not always linearly related to
symptom severity or other measures of disorderedness.
Rather the threshold problem must be dealt with by
selecting a symptom-based cut-off point. The cut-off point
is arbitrary, in the sense that it will map no natural division
between the disordered and normal, but it may be more or
less wisely chosen. Where possible, the threshold should be
set so that the advantages of diagnosis generally outweigh
the disadvantages. Finally, it should be borne in mind that
requiring harm, and requiring that symptom thresholds
are met, will not be enough, on its own, to prevent false
positives. False positives also arise for reasons that are
not dealt with here (for example, see Dr Wakefield's work
on the importance of requiring dysfunction-' and Horwitz
and Wakefield-''). For someone to be considered as having
a disorder, all the various criteria that act to rule out false
positives should be met concurrently.
If the approach championed here had been adopted then
DSM-5 would have included a general requirement that
disorder can only be diagnosed when a condition results in
harm. Sotne researchers would prefer to conduct research
without considering harrn. For such purposes, something
like the proposed distinction between paraphilias and
paraphiliac disorders (where a paraphilia is simply the
unusual pattem of sexual arousal, and a paraphiliac disorder
is diagnosed only on the basis of the unusual pattem of
sexual arousal plus harm) might have been introduced
across the whole classification.
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